Questions From Decision-Makers
By: Ricardo “Rickynomics” Alonzo
DOI: 30JAN2026
1. Could tariff-based secondary sanctions become a default tool in future geopolitical disputes?
Tariff-based secondary sanctions are unlikely to become automatic or universal, but they are increasingly available as a situational tool. Recent cases involving Greenland and Mexico show tariffs being used as signaling mechanisms to force accelerated negotiations rather than as permanent economic weapons. Their use depends on the administration in power's strategic objective, not on a standardized doctrine. Unlike prior approaches that absorbed allied costs to preserve cohesion, current U.S. behavior shows a greater willingness to apply pressure even to partners when resource access or supply chain control is at stake.
From a strategic standpoint, this reflects a shift toward securing upstream control of critical resources such as petroleum, uranium, lithium, quartz, and rare earth elements before competitors consolidate monopolistic positions. This mirrors methods long used by China, Russia, Iran, and India, where economic relationships prioritize resource capture and leverage over balanced diplomacy. The signal to allies is that access to U.S. markets and protection now carries reciprocal economic expectations. For households, this approach raises the risk of higher prices and supply disruptions as trade becomes a tool of power competition rather than efficiency.
2. What would success even look like under this framework?
Success is defined internally by the decision-makers who initiate the pressure, not by external compliance narratives. Under the current framework, success appears to mean maximum leverage over both allies and adversaries by controlling access to U.S. markets, capital, and strategic sectors. Energy, advanced manufacturing, and artificial intelligence are the core pressure points because dominance in these areas limits other states' alignment options. The objective is to reduce partners' ability to hedge economically against U.S. competitors.
Europe’s position illustrates this dynamic. Years of deindustrialization and outsourcing, combined with restrictive environmental policies, have increased European dependence on external supply chains and U.S. security guarantees. This dependency becomes leverage, not a liability, when tariffs and regulatory costs redirect foreign capital and revenue into the U.S. system. In practical terms, success means foreign economies indirectly supporting U.S. fiscal capacity through trade frictions, fines, and market dependence, with the intended downstream effect of stabilizing domestic spending pressures and cost-of-living challenges for Americans.
3. How should institutions distinguish between pressure escalation and pressure normalization?
Pressure escalation raises uncertainty and forces rapid repricing, while normalization embeds pressure into routine operations. Escalation takes the form of public threats, abrupt policy shifts, maximalist demands, and highly visible disputes, often involving allies who must preserve political credibility at home. Greenland fits this model, where overasking created room for negotiated access to strategic resources without formal territorial control. The visible conflict masked a narrower operational objective that emerged once the pressure peaked.
Normalization occurs when those pressures settle into predictable rules, stable enforcement, and accepted risk pricing. Markets stop reacting to headlines and start treating constraints as permanent features. With adversarial states such as Venezuela, pressure is applied more directly and with fewer signaling theatrics, reducing the need for normalization phases. For institutions and households, the key risk is misreading short-term escalation as permanent deterioration, since markets tend to overreact and capital often exits before conditions stabilize. This volatility increases costs and reduces investment confidence even when the long term structure remains intact.
